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As
published in the Report of the Ross Health Administration
Forum (1981).
Community Forces As Regulators
By Robert M. Sigmond
With the anticipated massive pullback in money and initiative
by the federal government and possible reduction in money
from corporate benefits managers, all the old regulators necessarily
will be called on
to do what they can to maintain some kind of predictability
and order, as well as social value, in the
health services field. In this situation, the oldest set of
forces we know in this country, community forces,
may take center stage with a whole new set of improvisations.
The pullback at the federal level already has started, and,
as you might expect, it's having a serious impact on state
and local governments, as well. In addition to cutbacks in
Medicaid and Medicare and other specific health programs on
October 1, 1981, the federal Community Health Services Administration
(CHSA) will close up shop. According to a story in the New
York Times on September 19, 1981, "Today the Community
Health Services Administration operates on a budget of $542
billion with 1,050 employees, none of whom is being transferred
to other government agencies. Administration officials estimate
that the elimination of the agency will save about $40 million
a year."
CHSA never operated on a budget of $542 billion. Its budget
was $542 million, but that's the kind of error
and confusion that characterize national views of community
service. The real significance is not the saving of 540 million
a year, but rather the closing down of one of the few reflections
of interest in community forces at the federal level.
The massive pullback in money on the part of corporate health
benefits managers is not supposed to start until new federal
laws are passed regulating their activities to make them conform
to anti- regulation-procompetition theories. Meanwhile, fringe
benefits payments always contract automatically during extended
periods of high unemployment. When a person is unemployed
long enough, all corporate fringe benefits are lost, and we
appear to be in a fairly long period of high unemployment.
Apparently, both government and corporate payments will be
pulled back, in money if not in initiative. There also appear
to be major new initiatives by business groups to regulate
their own activities at the community level. Whether this
turns out to be a community force as well as a business force
is still open, depending on the role of the benefits managers
as well as other parts of the corporation.
But if withdrawal of money from these sources is as massive
as current national policy leaders anticipate, what will happen
at the community level? Clearly, those institutions, organizations
and individuals in the health field that have been motivated
largely by economic goals can be expected to take strong defensive
and offensive action to avoid adverse effects of reduced income
flow. This will challenge the innovative capacities of institutions,
organizations, and individuals who are motivated by concerns
about their communities. And, in this interplay, the regulatory
role will necessarily fall on the community's institutions,
both those that follow the most self-serving strategies and
those that are the subject of my talk, which are leaders in
preserving and protecting community values.
Most people employed by hospitals and other community institutions
know who the regulators are. They are the individuals who
sign paychecks, who say "no" or "maybe next
year" when we want to hear "yes" or "right
away." For such employees, the managers of community
institutions are the real regulators.
In a sense, they are right. Hospital executives and other
community health agency executives are the regulators who
must respond to government influence, business coalitions,
economic forces, and consumer and professional demands and
requirements. The burden falls on administrators to bring
a sense of order and regularity to a complex scene dominated
by high expectations and scarce resources.
What forces become dominant during periods of cutbacks in
health resources? We have had earlier periods of massive contraction
of health services in our country. In each case, the burden
was picked up by community forces with little outside help.
As might be expected, the response was not optimum on the
part of every organization and community, but the loss of
life and well-being was less than might have been expected.
I'm referring specifically to the severe cutback in health
service resources during the Great Depression and World War
II. In the first instance, the cause was a massive decline
in the gross national product due to economic stagnation.
In the second instance, the cause was quite different. Diversion
of a large share of physicians, nurses, and other health service
staffing, along with a healthy segment of the population,
from the communities and a virtual cutoff of funds for capital
investment in civilian health service sources resulted.
These were not easy times for community health service agencies,
but most of them made it through. Innovation and new application
of old ideas played a large part. The Great Depression saw
the birth and
early growth of Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, as well
as commercial insurance and other forms of prepayment. World
War II saw the spontaneous application all over the country
of an old idea, early ambulation, that virtually doubled hospital
bed capacity without capital investment. Hospital emergency
rooms and ambulatory care programs began to change their character,
and people in every community began to make more extensive
use of self-care programs long before the professionals invented
the concepts.
In both situations, capital investment ground to a halt, but
the system didn't. Today is a good time for some enterprising
students to study these two key periods. In adapting to the
cutbacks, government did play a role, and some extremely imaginative
economists probably will be able to identify some marketplace
forces at work. But, in the final analysis, each community
had to rely on its own resources and its own leadership, and
the community forces were there and responded.
It's silly to romanticize about community forces, to expect
community forces to work in the best interests of everyone
and solve all the problems. But it's nonsense to assume that
they don't make any difference simply because they are almost
impossible to identify and quantify at the national level.
They are important forces for good or ill and will not go
away. Any formulation of the regulation of health services
that does not take community forces into account is so incomplete
as to be dangerous.
Let me be a bit more specific about my notion of community
forces. Community forces are individuals, agencies, and organizations
motivated by their concern for the well-being of the people
in some geographic community in which they are located. They
act at least in part for what they consider the best interest
of that community, rather than broader or narrower interests.
Few individuals or organizations are prepared to guide and
regulate all of their activities exclusively on the basis
of what's best for their community, but many find it difficult
in regulating their own activities to disregard the community.
The issue is not community interest versus self-interest.
Rather, the issue is how to encourage a healthy balancing
of community and other interests so that some degree of overlap
and interdependence is incorporated into the
decision-making processes.
Generally, the smaller the community with which the company
or organization is identified, the greater the threat to that
community's stability, and the more likely that the individual
or organization will identify community interest with more
obvious self-interest. The plant manager in a one company-one
hospital town will take an entirely different point of view
toward his company's self-interest with respect to the town's
hospital utilization than the company's national manager of
fringe benefits costs or a plant manager in a multihospital-multicompany
town. Companies have to consider that fact as they get involved
in this subject.
In the single hospital-one company town, the plant manager
is more likely to be interested in the hospital as a factor
in recruiting and retaining a happy work force in the community
than in simple fringe benefits costs. The physician on the
staff of a hospital with an explicit institutional commitment
to a defined population in a specific community, which makes
that commitment a major consideration in allocation of scarce
resources, is likely to view the health service requirements
of the people in that community much differently than a physician
who does not depend on such an institution.
Community forces are pervasive and can be mobilized to exert
strong regulatory power in specific situations when the conditions
are right. The first condition for the mobilization of community
forces is some recognition of a broad community interest by
various elements within the community. Two other conditions
already have been mentioned size of the community, and the
extent to which elements in the community are able to integrate
self-interest with community interest.
Other conditions are important in determining the power of
community forces in specific situations. Of these, the most
important are the nature of the community leadership, the
kind of formal or informal infrastructure developed over the
years by that leadership, and the extent to which incentive
systems can be structured to strengthen rather than to undermine
community forces. And finally, the degree of tolerance of
aberrant behavior in a community must be considered.
Consider each of these factors in relation to the subject
of this forum-regulation of the health service system, particularly
health care expenditures.
From a community point of view, cost containment is clearly
a key element in any strategy to assure effective health services
for the entire community in an environment of sharply shrinking
resources. Health services as currently organized in most
communities cost a lot of money. Health services will cost
more money than likely will be available in the future. Therefore,
those in the community who are interested in maintaining effective
health services must direct their attention to containing
costs, so that the available resources can continue to support
some kind of a system of health protection that will be available
when required in that community.
The know-how for communities to adapt to massive cutbacks
in resources is available, just as it was during the Great
Depression and World War II. It can be done without endangering
the health of the people or the financial viability of essential
services, so long as the focus is on the community. The real
danger is that
the key elements of the community may not consider the entire
community as they respond to
shrinking resources.
The health insurance plan whose only concern is the size of
subscribers' premiums does more harm than good, no matter
how attractive the benefits package and the price. The hospital
that focuses exclusively on services to patients who are able
to pay may do more harm than good no matter how efficiently
operated. The Fortune 500 corporation that acts only to hold
down its fringe benefits costs without considering community
impact may find itself caught by conflicting forces within
the corporation and the communities where it is located. Separate
but equal health services for the rich and the poor really
cannot be supported in most communities financially, morally,
or managerially, the concept is unacceptable.
Ideally, all who are involved should have broad concern for
the community's total health resources as they deal with their
own specific problems. Everyone won't do that, but many can
be encouraged to try, and those who do try can become powerful
community forces necessarily drawn into community action.
Almost all of the motivations and responses of community forces
tend to be stronger in smaller communities that is, recognition
that certain services won't be available other than through
community action, concern about one's neighbors, willingness
to contribute more than one's fair share to the community,
recognition of such unusual contributions, etc.
But effective regulation of health services in a period of
scarce resources always has required the mobilization of community
resources on a much broader basis than neighborhoods and similar
settings. Except in unusual situations, however, community
forces do not have major impact for the country if the community
is very small. And they may not have a major impact on the
community if the community has 250,000 or 500,000 people.
In the next few years, we will learn a great deal more about
the subject of optimum size for community forces to work.
The size of effective community units (neither too large nor
too small) will be crucial in mobilizing these forces for
regulating health services.
Integration of community interest and self-interest is necessary
community interest only achieves force when viewed in the
framework of self-interest. Amazing results are achieved when
a wide range of community elements begin to make decisions
based on what often is called enlightened self-interest, and
when some critical mass of common forces unites and identifies
some element of community interest.
Community force is not achieved by pitting those who put community
ahead of self against those who put self ahead of community.
Such a confrontation is bound to be self-defeating. Every
element of community
will approach the question of community interest from its
own self-interest. One can hope to broaden the perspective,
but community interest not identified with self-interest loses
its force; it really has no force. Successful motivation of
community forces always has involved identification of community
interest with
a variety of self-interests.
Community leadership and infrastructure are inseparable elements
in mobilizing community interest to become community forces
to be reckoned with. Leadership is inextricably linked with
followership. Community leaders are those from special interest
groups who are able to identify, articulate, and act on their
own group's unique, enlightened self-interest without losing
their basic identification with that group's particular interest.
This type of leadership has existed in communities such as
Rochester, Pittsburgh,
and to some extent, Detroit, for years. It appears to be emerging
in such other cities as Akron, Toledo, Atlanta, and Minneapolis.
It may not be just an accident of history that this past month
the American Hospital Association's (AHA's) House of Delegates
adopted a new statement on hospital leadership that has been
hammered out over the past 2 years guided by Gail Warden and
Irv Wilmot. The AHA's leadership statement sets forth the
obligation of hospital trustees, medical staff, and executive
management to have as their primary mission the improvement
of the health and well-being of the people in their communities.
If only one hospital in every community attempted to carry
out this kind of leadership, now incorporated as fundamental
AHA policy, the whole issue of regulation of health services
would have to be reformulated. This policy statement really
views the hospital not just as a provider agency, but as an
agency that reflects the interests and concerns of providers
and consumers, and sets a whole new standard for hospital
leadership.
Whether or not this statement will begin to have the kind
of force that will regulate hospital behavior in various communities
is still to be seen.
Leadership is not enough as, incidentally, the AHA statement
makes clear. Some kind of infrastructure is required through
which those who are committed to community forces, those who
are community forces, can get together, to share experiences
and insights, strategies and work plans. In this respect,
formal structure and representation are not as important as
commitment and a spirit of cooperation. Community forces can
begin to achieve unbelievable power when those who can make
a difference get together in settings of mutual trust and
shared confidence.
Hospital consortia and business coalitions that are at opposite
ends of the pole now may be a necessary transitional step
from the adversarial atmosphere of the Health Systems Agency
(HSA) era to the new community health coalitions beginning
to take shape. If hospital consortia and business coalitions
recognize the necessity to address community problems, they
almost inevitably will come together as a powerful community
force.
Mobilization of community forces will require reconceptualization
and restructuring of incentive systems in the health services
field. We've heard a little about that. The complex set of
interdependencies in the health field provides a rich atmosphere
of give and take that is the framework for a wide variety
of positive and negative incentives - some hard financial
incentives and some softer, but just as real. Community commitments
and obligations can be built into all contractual commitments
and transactions, no matter
what they are.
Medical staff appointments, licenses, accreditation, third-party
contracts, capital investment, philanthropy, tax exemptions,
patient-physician relationships all can be transformed into
powerful community forces by dealing with them in terms of
incentives. This is an extremely fertile field, which some
Blue Cross plans and some self-insurers have begun to cultivate.
There is much opportunity here for turning community aspirations
into community forces by enriching the conditions for give
and take.
For example: The hospital makes it a condition of a hospital
staff appointment that a physician can't turn down Medicaid
patients or those who have lost Medicaid benefits in federal
cutbacks. That will have a profound incentive effect. In mobilizing
community forces, acceptance of aberrant behavior is terribly
important and not understood. Acceptance and protection of
aberrant behavior symbolized by the village idiot, the town
drunk, the Greenwich Village eccentric, the millionaire, the
miser, the philanthropist, or the
so-called community hospital that won't go along is the true
distinguishing characteristic of the
American community.
Community forces usually protect aberrant behavior even as
they identify it as such. Tolerance of nonconformists, tolerance
of antisocial behavior is an essential part of the process
of endorsing, embracing, and rewarding ever-higher standards
of community service. Community forces seldom trade on negative
incentives. The objective is not to punish self-serving elements
or aberrant elements in the community.
If punishment is required, there's always the government with
its police powers. The major weakness of the HSA as contrasted
with earlier forms of community-focused health planning agencies
was the emphasis
on stifling aberrant behavior and prescribing acceptable behavior
in deadening detail. Community planning agencies of the future
ideally will avoid this mistake, which can only create a barren
environment for mobilization of community forces. The emphasis
should be on the greater rewards of community
service as contrasted with the lesser rewards of self-service.
A great deal more could be said about community forces and
how they can be mobilized to regulate the flow of money, resources,
and energy in the health field to achieve better results.
Ideally, there would be time for detailed research to determine
how best to mobilize community resources in relation to the
factors mentioned and how to avoid the many pitfalls and frustrations
of the past. The best we can do is to try
to refine the kinds of impressions and hints that are set
forth in this paper.
What is called for now is a variety of demonstrations in various
communities throughout the land. Some philanthropic foundations
appear to be ready to support such demonstrations, and many
communities appear to be ready to apply the lessons learned
from the various abortive community-focused efforts of the
1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s to the complex environment
of the 1980s. For effective regulation of health services,
no other alternative may be available today.
Panel Discussant
Roderic M. Bell
I would like to comment on Mr. Sigmond's remarks about the
community's influences as a regulator, as a stimulator, and
as a force in hospital and health activities. I am in Texas,
where the local communities
tend to generate things they need in terms of health. They
are generous about putting up money for
health systems.
Texans tend to resist regulatory process in any form if it
comes from outside the bounds of their own city or county.
That's been a tough problem in the last several years, but
our people have responded to it. Not only health care but
also other social services and the arts have been well served
by local community forces, and this has brought a balance
between health and the arts and the more gracious things of
life. We've been fortunate, as a relatively new, pioneering
area, in having a sense of "can do" and "will
do," and we will take care of the things that we need
for our local environment and life-styles. Health services,
particularly, have benefited from this type of attitude and
environment.
I hope there will be more of these attitudes across the country.
I suspect we.re starting to see the pendulum swing back politically.
More local control will return, and local control implies
local initiative as well. It doesn't mean the negative part,
it means stimulation of the positive part. The things our
communities need will be initiated and generated within the
local framework. This story will illustrate my sense of community
participation and policy direction.
In the mid-1950s, a powerful banker in Dallas named Fred Florence,
chairman of the board, chief executive officer of Republic
Bank, was associated with a local Catholic hospital.
Fred called half a dozen people together and asked, "What's
the hospital situation?" One of the sisters replied that
Dallas was on the verge of a major population explosion and
that the hospitals were, by and large, getting behind the
nation. Mr. Florence accepted this and said, "We can't
do it all at one time."
The situation in Dallas goes back to money, which is one theme
of this conference-some say lack of, some say too much. Dallas
has a controlled system of fund-raising. You don't go out
and raise money without the blessing of the Citizens' Council-50
top executives in banking, insurance, etc. who control the
system and schedule the fundraising activities. You ask permission
and you get a good spot 1, 2, or 3 years down
the road.
The capacity for gift funds of the city has been about $60
or $80 million. When the city gets close to that, the Council
starts putting things off. The citizens tend to support this.
In short, if you don't have the seal of approval from the
Citizens' Council to raise funds, you haven't got a chance.
You don't get money from foundations, banks, insurance companies,
or anybody else. With the seal of approval, the banks will
pick up 5% of your campaign, the utility companies about 4%,
the rest of business 4%, and one or two foundations another
2% to 4%. You go in with 15% or 20% toward your objective.
The key to all this is that in 1956, the Citizens' Council
said, "You hospitals get together and decide whose need
is the greatest. We will set up dates for you in alternate
years, with the hospital that has the greatest need coming
first." Mr. Florence has been dead for 15 years, but
this pattern still exists. The community has accepted this
as an ongoing responsibility, and it's been a major contribution
to health care in Dallas. This is what I mean by community
activity and community regulation.
Last week, the mayor convinced a local company to give a $3
million piece of land in the heart of downtown for the fine
arts center as a tax deduction. We're going to have another
major center in the heart of the city as a result of broad
community action. The $3 million gift that this company gave
is being matched by
$22 million, half in tax funds and half in gift funds that
already have been committed.
This story about Dallas can be applied other than to health
care, and it represents an attitude about results, an achievement
of things that are good for a particular community. Houston
does equally well. Some other cities in Texas are not this
good, but they are stronger than those in many other states.
This is the positive part of the answer. Through this process,
we tend to regulate ourselves in a positive rather than a
negative fashion. The results have been gratifying, and they
will continue to be so for many years, because new people
become caught up in these attitudes, and leadership follows
this same pattern because it's been good for them. This is
how we approach the business of community controls in meeting
our individual citizens' needs.
Panel Discussant
Thomas G. Parris, Jr.
As a member of that high-risk occupational group that must
maintain the degree of predictability Mr Sigmond refers to,
I'd like to share with you four concerns of the front-line
manager, whether a hospital administrator or a community agency
leader. The four areas are 1) the integration of community
interest and self-interest; 2) the rate of change, or the
expectation of the rate of change by all those constituencies
that we discussed; 3) the involvement of physicians in this
whole process of change; and 4) the adequacy of
management information.
Dr. Somers discussed a taxonomy of constituencies within which
the management process occurs.
We must deal with various kinds of consumer groups to make
change, and the dynamics of that vary from moment to moment,
period to period. Our circumstances now are different from
those of the recent past.
It's wrong to assume that front-line managers are fully aware
of the diversity of consumer groups, and that they all understand
the extent to which one group may be biased. If I, as a manager,
am going to deal effectively with one of those groups and
if there is to be any positive change, I have to put the group's
strategy into a broader societal or community context. One
of the most important regulator groups that
was omitted from Dr Somers' list is physicians and other health
professionals. Physicians and other health professionals consume
the greatest majority of health care resources. That's what
we're really talking about, not just the new mother who wants
family-centered maternity care. Most of the front-line managers
don't appreciate how much bias or ignorance or lack of awareness
is shown by that health professional.
A physician may say, "I'm concerned about the quality
of life. I want these resources, and that's it.
I don't want to hear anything about those external world forces
or anything else." The reality for some
poorly managed or structured institution is that you deliver
or else.
These four things, then, are highly interactive: the involvement
of physicians, management information, the rate of change,
and the integration of community interest and self-interest.
If the physician had a different awareness about the totality,
he or she might act differently and place different demands
on the system for change. This is true of any special interest
group; it most likely will have a highly focused and extreme
bias about what it wants from the system.
We have to begin to integrate those concerns, needs, and objectives
and arrive at a consensus. Therefore, we have to make a greater
effort to educate all those constituencies about the totality,
ie, to work within the system and that broader, interactive
context.
Similarly, we may characterize the participants' expectation
of the rate of change. Unless we get down to a practical level
and force the addressing of these impediments, we'll be back
here next year and the year after, etc. We'll never begin
to make positive change. As I indicated, most special interest
groups approach us in a different way. They have certain objectives,
and they make no bones about it. If it's the third-party payers,
they're looking at the bottom line. They say, "We want
to negotiate line by line." My colleagues don't want
to negotiate line by line because they may be very vulnerable.
How can I get into things like incentives, positive ones?
Or, how can I defend keeping certain dollars in my base unless
I can begin to dissect the cost components? Obviously, if
I am underfinanced, I would prefer dealing at the specific
rather than gross level to force a greater accountability
on payers for cost containment decisions.
Third parties may say, "We have only this much money
to support your overall programs. Therefore, you will have
to reallocate resources and modify your operating budget within
this next operating period." This may not be realistic.
It could take you years to change operating patterns, and
it may take you even more years to recoup from a bad short-term
decision that will have long-term, serious consequences.
I am a strong advocate of greater, more informed participation
by physicians in the management and governance process, and
that does not necessarily mean sitting on a board of trustees.
The participation is not happening because of resistance from
my colleagues and resistance from physicians, perhaps a majority
of them. It's lack of attitudinal as well as educational preparation
at all levels.
I suggest, however, that physicians will stand naked in terms
of scientific, technological capabilities unless they learn
and are prepared to work within a system that deals with the
rest of that system all those other dimensions we have talked
about these last couple of days. Otherwise, they will never
be able to translate those capabilities into improved health
care delivery, individually or collectively. All these other
forces out there, despite what you have heard from our previous
speakers about business coalitions, etc, want to know what
kind of outcome they will get for their investment.
I urge that we at least attempt to restructure our medical
education programs at all levels undergraduate, graduate,
and continuing medical education. I don't mean just a couple
hours per year, but some continuing, intensive exposure for
both new and practicing physicians to the realities, and some
guidelines for working within the system.
Such guidelines should not cover how to run an office practice
alone, but rather how to work within a hospital and how to
work within the broader community of institutions that Bob
Sigmond refers to. An attitudinal change is needed, and that.s
the purpose of the American Hospital Association's (AHA's)
leadership documents, that is, interdependent relationship
roles rather than the standard independent approach.
The recent American Medical Association House of Delegates
meeting bore out my concerns with all their resolutions about
"Let us get a crack at the trustees first and leave the
administrators out. We want to give them the doctor's perspective."
I say to them, the practicing administrator is your best advocate
if you.re a physician, not your adversary. The administrator
knows how to deal with and manipulate the system, ie, how
to take scarce resources and turn them into an environment
for practicing better medicine.
We have discussed another major concern, the inadequate management
information systems. I don't know how you determine cost benefit.
Neither do I know how to define productivity, standards of
care, or quality. I'm embarrassed to admit that to my other
friends in industry. They tell me that the automotive industry
and others are not as sophisticated as they think they are,
but from what I've seen they appear to be more sophisticated.
Unfortunately, we as providers are at a great risk of being
clobbered by gross indices. Frequently, we hear that "costs
have gone up by X percent," or "your cost per day
is X." You have to look at what the parts of those costs
are before you can make intelligent decisions about reallocation
of resources or intelligent planning decisions. I hope we'll
have people in positions who are prepared to understand what
planning is, and who'll be committed to showing differential
cost benefit as a basis for making decisions. How do you have
a price-sensitive market? How do you construct price when
you don't know what the cost components are? I don't know
how, and that's why I suggest that this is a major area where
we need help.
Focus Group ReportOn Duane Heintz's/Robert Sigmond's
Presentations
Some
participants felt that business coalitions might be characterized
as buyers who were interested in a defensive ploy in a period
of constrained resources. One rather large motivation among
this group is a disinclination to pick up the slack that's
been created by the federal withdrawal. What is the motivation
of the participants in these business coalitions? Is it merely
cost, or are quality and access considerations also important?
Are the business coalitions simply out to cap expenses as
the feds would like to do and as other groups have proposed
in various places? Even though that may be their objective,
unlike the government, at least coalitions offer a willingness
to work with the provider community and not to simply impose
these things unilaterally without discussion.
Some
people perceived business coalitions as a real threat to the
delivery system; once utilization is cut, prices are next.
Another feeling was that coalitions are totally uninformed.
This is frightening to health administrators, because as government
pulls back and retrenches, cuts on reimbursement, and tries
to extract itself, business will increasingly become a dominant
force. Insurance also will become much more activated, driven
largely by the business corporations around the business premium
dollar. The groups agreed that there may be a significant
risk in benefits managers' acquiring too much influence and
power. Troubles could result as their influence grows.
There
was also a concern that within the business community may
be an inherent conflict of interest. The chief executive officer
(CEO) often has a role as a trustee in a community institution
service. Yet, within the CEO's business organization, the
benefits manager's objective is likely to be to minimize the
expenditure of the firm. The CEO somehow must balance this
self-interest of the corporation with the community interest
represented by his trusteeship.
Another
problem is that if business coalitions are self-contained
without much input from health care leadership, they may simply
reinvent many of the processes that health providers already
have developed. A lot of the early work on business coalitions
is focusing on building data bases. One danger is that in
the early stages everyone wants the best data available and
to build the best data system. Business coalition progress
could be slowed by the fact that you never have all the data
that you need. If the business coalitions spend a lot of their
time over the next year or so trying to get all the data,
ultimately they may be lost. That's why the groups felt community
linkages should be fostered early, focusing on a few manageable
tasks and moving to those quickly. In this sense, the focus
groups could see some positive, productive results coming
out of these efforts.
By
the nature of the coalition-provider relationship, when the
two get together, the dialogue and effectiveness seem to be
diminished. We're probably in a long process of change where
each group will need to meet separately at first, getting
input from one another, before the confrontation and the joint
effort come to pass. Cost and quality must be kept in balance,
and business coalitions must know this if they are to
be successful.
The
solutions designed may well exclude the poor and the near
poor, creating a two-tier system of health care. Reimbursement
considerations limit the ability of the teaching hospital
to prevent the two-tier system from developing. If the medically
indigent are diverted into community support institutions,
county hospitals, and city hospitals, the quality of service
necessarily has to deteriorate because of a lack of resources
at such institutions. It was suggested that these types of
institutions ought not to exist and that patients now supported
by the community for their health care preferably would be
sent to private organizations.
It
was pointed out that court decisions have made it mandatory
that local governments be responsible for people in this category,
but such laws would not prevent them from being sent to private
organizations.
The focus groups were emphatic that, unlike where a hospital
simply agrees to provide all the services needed for medically
indigent patients, this program would be an explicitly negotiated
agreement for X number of services at a level of quality for
a set group of people. The agreement would not be open-ended,
with the administrator of the institution stuck with trying
to figure out who doesn't get what available services. Perhaps
business coalitions can help support a new type of health
care structure that better serves
the community.
The
focus groups noted that individual corporations like the Deere
Company, for example, are having some success. However, most
business coalitions are not as far along. Most are still talking,
trying to figure out what they can do. When the business coalitions
and community forces as reflected by health care leadership
are considered, a need emerges to mesh these forces. People
are concerned that the emergence of business coalitions reflects
segmentation within the industry. Coalitions are corporate
in their identity, and they do not involve the medical leadership.
Resolving the cost issues that are bringing the business coalitions
together is crucial. To that end, the corporate leaders, the
architects or stimulators of the business coalitions, must
be brought together with the health care leadership to make
the business coalition part of
a broader community orientation toward health.
This
bringing together of business and trustees, labor and physicians,
and other community forces at the highest corporate level
ultimately will benefit the patient. Such a broad community
group can respond in terms of access to care and quality,
other forces that are just as important as cost.
Ultimately,
by bringing these forces together-those who have been involved
in the delivery system with those who are worried about paying,
we have the opportunity to mutually solve our problems.
More
information-sharing is needed across these lines. The health
care leadership needs to know much more about the concerns
of the business community and vice versa. At some point, the
issues could come to a community forum from which the ultimate
issue can be addressed-how to best serve the patient.
By
bringing the business and health care leaderships together,
some positive, built-in relationships can occur. As noted
earlier, business leadership is an important ingredient of
health care trusteeship.
This natural linkage can be productive to both sides. The
focus groups felt strongly that broader
community leadership in the health care industry wants to
assist coalitions as they get going, focusing
on very positive objectives.
One
admonition that came from the focus group discussion is that
providers, hospitals, are notorious for lack of knowledge
about their own benefits plans. Hospital directors might take
a look at the dollars spent and the kinds of programs that
the hospital is conducting for its own people.
The
view was expressed that a hospital is not a social agency.
It may be an agent, but not an agency.
In some communities, the health care industry is the single
largest employer. Even within the health framework, then,
self-interests must be considered and how they are tied up
with community interests.
Self-interest is not easily diverted into the community in
this country, and short-term self-interest is
really competitive.
After
discussing the nature of community leaders and the nature
of the organizations that emerge within a community in terms
of creating leadership, the focus groups concluded that all
communities do have some leadership structure. Even in cities
like New York, significant groups have emerged as community
leaders. Of course, community forces differ as environment
or geography differs.
The
physician is a significant force in molding the future of
health services. Running a medical care system without doctors
is difficult, and they must have a role in the system. In
terms of community trends, the groups noted a significant
increase in group practice throughout the country, reflecting
an increasing dependency on medical teams. There were some
thoughts expressed that physicians of the new generation seem
to have some epidemiological approaches to the practice of
their profession. Some felt that when the physician encounters
the greenback, these trends sometimes are diverted slightly,
and that the new generation of doctors seems to be different
in terms of their interests in primary care, prevention, and
matters beyond acute care.
The
focus groups discussed the analogy between the current situation
and the eras of World War II and the Depression. They agreed
that community interest and the coalescing of interest groups
is like a roller coaster. There are highs and lows in community
interest, and now probably is one of the low spots. In years
to come, new types of coalitions will emerge. Unlike some
past coalitions, providers should be active participants in
them, and consumer representation should not be required for
every miniscule subgroup. Situations where one must search
desperately to find the person that can qualify to become
a member of this group should be avoided. Broad representation
is desirable, but within some obvious limits. One final and
important message from Bob Sigmond is that there now is great
opportunity for the health leader. He or she should seize
this chance to become the catalyst, the initiator, who will
lead the formation of these community coalitions.
